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SOVEREIGNTY, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND HUMAN 
SECURITY IN  
NATIVE AMERICAN NATIONS 
 
W. Gregory Guedel∗ 
 
I want to build on our true government-to-government relationship…As we made 
clear in the Executive Order earlier this year that established the White House 
Council on Native American Affairs, we have a unique legal and political 
relationship, one that’s been affirmed many times in treaties, in statutes and in the 
Constitution.  That’s the unique relationship we honor today.  That’s the 
relationship we're called upon to sustain for the progress of all of our 
peoples…let’s keep our covenant strong by strengthening justice and Tribal 
sovereignty.1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
These powerful words from President Obama are encouraging for 
advocates of enhancing the sovereignty of Native American nations, but the 
President himself confirmed an equally important fact: “What matters far more than 
words—what matters far more than any resolution or declaration—are actions to 
match those words.”2 This study explores elements of the sovereignty dynamic in 
the government-to-government relationship between the United States and Native 
American nations to assess 1) what benefits Tribal communities glean from this 
unique relationship; and 2) whether enhanced Tribal sovereignty can enhance 
overall quality of life for Native Americans. This study seeks to identify approaches 
for understanding economic development and human security conditions unique to 
*Mr. Guedel is Chair of Native American Legal Services for Foster Pepper PLLC in Seattle, a 
researcher at the University of Washington Jackson School of International Studies, and serves as 
Chair of the American Bar Association’s Committee on Native American Concerns.  The author is 
tremendously grateful to Dr. Christina Wygant of the University of Washington’s Program for the 
Comparative History of Ideas for her contributions and editing of this paper. 
1 President Barack Obama, White House, Remarks by the President at Tribal Nations 
Conference, (Nov. 13, 2013) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-
and-video/video/2013/11/13/president-obama-speaks-2013-tribal-nations-
conference#transcript).  
2 Gregory Guedel, White House Tribal Nations Conference Progress Report Released, NATIVE 
AMERICAN LEGAL UPDATE, (Dec. 6, 2011), http://www.nativelegalupdate.com/2011/12/articles/white-
house-tribal-nations-conference-progress-report-released. 
17
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW JOURNAL Volume III, Issue I – Fall 2014  
Tribal communities by examining empirical results from specific instances of Tribal 
sovereignty assertions.  This study focuses on “Sovereignty Events”— wherein 
Tribal governments individually and/or collectively assert sovereignty through 
definable actions commencing at an identifiable point in time—to show how these 
events allow for growth, development, and increased security within the Tribes.  
Three case studies centered on the sovereign resource of Tribal gaming revenues 
are presented: 
 
1. Increases and growth trends in Tribal gaming revenue following California 
v. Cabazon; 
2. Allocation of Tribal gaming revenue for political contributions to increase 
Tribal influence in Washington, D.C.; and 
3. Poverty outcomes in Tribal communities relative to Tribal gaming revenue. 
 
There are presently 566 federally-recognized Tribes within the United 
States, and the United States and Tribal nations share governmental control over 
policies and programs affecting Native Americans in a unique legal arrangement 
known as “domestic dependent sovereignty”.3  It is a treaty-based, government-to-
government relationship in which federally recognized Tribes are treated as 
separate nations whose sovereignty has in some areas been reduced from the 
traditional nation-state.4  This paradigm is the manifestation of several centuries of 
evolution, wherein European colonial powers and the United States government 
forcibly undermined (and at times abolished) the organic societies and political 
organizations of the indigenous people of the Americas. Despite the fact that 
Native American nations are geographically located within the territorial 
boundaries of the United States, the United States and Tribal governments are 
engaged in an international relationship, which calls for analysis utilizing the 
methodologies and metrics of international development research. 
 
Within the field of International Studies, human security is viewed as a 
means of holistically “creating political, social, environmental, economic, military, 
and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, 
3 See, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831). 
4 Between 1776 and 1871, over 379 treaties were ratified between the United States government 
and Tribal nations, and these treaties continue to form a fundamental element of the present 
government-to-government relationship.  See JEFF CORNTASSEL & RICHARD C. WITMER, FORCED 
FEDERALISM: CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO INDIGENOUS NATIONHOOD 58 (2008). 
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livelihood, and dignity.”5  For Native American nations, human security provides a 
broad description of the conditions that impact the quality of life in a given Tribal 
community: physical security, economic development, public health, cultural 
freedom, and others.  The statistics for Native American communities have 
chronically registered unfavorably compared to the United States national average 
in most measurable areas of human security including higher rates of preventable 
disease, lower employment, increased poverty, and higher levels of violent crime.  
Professor Kevin Bruyneel of Babson College has argued that the increased 
assertion of Tribal [S]overeignty “can open up realms of political maneuverability 
for indigenous people”, offering a new pathway for addressing human security 
conditions.6  For many Native American nations, sovereignty appears to hold the 
potential to be a transformative political and socio-economic force to deploy in the 
effort to ameliorate chronic poverty, preventable disease, and social justice issues. 
 
Working from the institution of national Tribal casino gaming at the end of 
the 1980s, the research described in this article analyzes Tribal policies and 
implementation approaches intended to result in measurable improvements in 
Native American human security indicators.  Combining information from 
government and academic sources with new data and research analytics, this 
study seeks to provide some evidence-based answers to the question: “How does 
Tribal sovereignty impact human security in Native American nations, and does 
enhanced Tribal sovereignty lead to enhanced quality of life?”   
 
With Tribal gaming revenue and its specific uses as the manifestations of 
Tribal assertion of sovereignty, this study presents three case studies with 
empirical outcomes of Sovereignty Events related to Tribal economic resource 
development, Tribal political influence on congressional funding for the U.S. 
Bureau of Indian Affairs, and poverty levels within Native American nations located 
in the northwestern United States. 
5 JAMES K. WELLMAN JR. & CLARK B. LOMBARDI, RELIGION AND HUMAN SECURITY: A GLOBAL 
PERSPECTIVE 7 (2012). 
6 KEVIN BRUYNEEL, THE THIRD SPACE OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE POSTCOLONIAL POLITICS OF U.S.-
INDIGENOUS RELATIONS 229 (2007). 
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A. Overview of Native American Human Security Issues 
 
There are approximately 5.2 million Native American and Alaska Natives in 
the United States.7  49 percent self-identify their race as Native only, and 51 
percent identify as Native in combination with one or more other races.8  Empirical 
data on human security measures for Native Americans has chronically indicated 
sub-standard conditions compared with the population of the United States as a 
whole, and certain fundamental metrics on economic development, law 
enforcement, and public health indicate problems of crisis proportions.9  For 
example: 
 
• 27 percent of Native Americans live in poverty, the highest rate for any 
racial group in the United States, and nearly double the national average.  
The median household income of Native Americans in 2012 was $35,310—
the national average was $51,371.10 
• Tribal communities experience rates of violent crime and domestic violence 
that substantially exceed national averages. Of all federal criminal cases 
involving juveniles in 2008, nearly half involved Native American youth. The 
percentage of successful prosecutions for on-reservation crime is 
significantly lower. Of the 566 federally recognized Tribes in the U.S., only 
178 have law enforcement agencies that employ at least one full-time 
sworn officer with general arrest powers.11 
7 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. CENSUS: THE AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE POPULATION, (Dep’t 
of Commerce Jan. 2012), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-10.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 4, 2014). 
8 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE HERITAGE MONTH: NOVEMBER 2013, 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU NEWS (Dep’t of Commerce Oct. 31, 2013), available at 
http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/pdf/cb13ff-26_aian.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2014) 
[hereinafter U.S. CENSUS]. 
9 As United States policy makers and international academics place increasing emphasis on global 
wealth inequality, the disparity between Native American nations and the rest of the United States 
provides a stark case study.  For example, the state of South Dakota is the corporate headquarters 
home to banks controlling assets in excess of $2.76 trillion - the highest amount of capital of any 
state in the nation- while the state’s residents living on the Oglala Sioux Pine Ridge Reservation 
have the lowest per-capita income in the country.  The state currently has the third-lowest overall 
unemployment rate in the United States at 3.7%, yet unemployment on Pine Ridge typically 
exceeds 75%.  See: South Dakota - Quietly Booming, The Economist, August 30, 2014, p.27. 
10 American Indian and Alaska Native Poverty Rate about 50 Percent in Rapid City, S.D., and 
about 30 Percent in Five Other Cities, Census, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, (Feb. 20, 2013), 
http://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2013/cb13-29.html#. 
11 Census of State and Local law Enforcement Agencies, 2008, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
July 26, 2011, http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=2216. 
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• Native Americans have the highest rate of suicide in the U.S., and a 
homicide rate three times higher than whites.12 
 
Given that these perilous human security conditions exist within the borders 
of one of the most highly developed nations in the world, the extent and 
persistence of negative indicators for Native Americans calls for the analysis of 
root causes and viable modes of action toward improvement. 
B. Research Hypothesis 
 
For over 200 years, the United States government has held primary control 
over economic development and human security resources and programs 
impacting Native Americans.13  The empirical results of this balance of sovereignty 
for America’s indigenous people have been chronically poor. Identifying more 
promising pathways for increasing Native American development indicators stands 
today as a political and moral imperative for both the U.S. and Tribal governments.  
The research discussed in this article examines the hypothesis that economic 
development and human security indicators for Native Americans can be improved 
by shifting more control over socio-economic programs and resources to Tribal 
governments, i.e. enhancing Tribal sovereignty.  The underlying assumptions are 
that enhanced Tribal sovereignty allows economic and human security 
development programs to be tailored to specific local needs and conditions, be 
implemented more efficiently, and maintain consistency with indigenous culture 
and traditions. 
 
The research will test whether increased control by a Tribal government 
over a specific resource or program results in a measurable increase in a related 
human security condition for the Tribal community.  Following a Sovereignty Event 
as described below, the study expects to see measurable improvement in the 
related human security condition (e.g. an increase in the annual revenue of an 
economic activity that is taken over or created by Tribal governments). 
12 CDC Health Disparities and Inequalities Report – United States, 2011. 
13 VINE DELORIA & DAVID WILKINS, TRIBES, TREATES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBULATIONS 71-78  
(1999). 
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C. Assessing Native American Human Security – Independent and 
Dependent Variables 
 
The methodological approach in this research is to assess the impact of 
Tribal Sovereignty Events on selected human security data.  A Sovereignty Event 
is a term I created to describe an act taken by a Tribe or Tribes that results in: 1) 
the development of new resources for the Tribal community; 2) increased control 
by Tribal government over programs and/or resources previously managed by the 
U.S. government connected to human security; and/or 3) utilizing Tribal resources 
to impact U.S. policy toward Native American human security.   A Sovereignty 
Event offers a clear point in time for comparing before-and-after performance of 
measurable economic development and human security indicators.  Examples of 
Sovereignty Events include, but are not limited to, Tribes signing a treaty with the 
United States or a compact with state government, winning a lawsuit to confirm 
sovereignty rights, or creating a unique sovereign enterprise within Tribal lands.   
 
For this study, three Sovereignty Events that serve as Independent 
Variables are: 
 
1) The institution of national Tribal casino gaming via the outcome of 
the California v. Cabazon federal litigation in 1987 (Case Study 
1); 
 
2) The use by Tribes of gaming revenue dollars to make political 
contributions to U.S. Senators, 1997-2006 (Case Study 2); and 
 
3) The collective gaming revenue obtained by Tribes in the 
Northwestern U.S. between 2001-2010 (Case Study 3). 
 
This study will analyze the three Sovereignty Event case studies to assess 
their relationship to the corresponding Dependent Variables: measurable 
economic development and human security outcomes connected to the 
Sovereignty Events.  The analysis will focus specifically on economic performance 
and related human security indicators.  The three corresponding Dependent 
Variables for the study are: 
 
22
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1) Tribal economic resource development, in the form of new 
revenue realized from casino gaming operations between 1995-
2005 (Case Study 1); 
 
2) U.S. Congressional appropriations for the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
between 1997-2006 (Case Study 2); and 
 
3) Poverty statistics for members of NIGC Region 1 Tribes between 
2000-2010 (Case Study 3). 
 
The three case studies offer before-and-after comparisons of measurable 
Native American economic development and human security indicators relative to 
Sovereignty Events designed to impact them.  The goal of the research is to 
identify the extent to which the assertion of Tribal governments’ sovereignty is 
associated with empirical increases in economic development and human security 
indicators in Tribal communities, i.e. whether quality of life within a Tribe can be 
measurably increased if Tribal governments take greater control over programs 
and resources for the benefit of their members. 
II. STUDY 
A. Case Study 1: Tribal Gaming and Economic Resource Development14 
 
A chronic problem that has hampered the advancement of Tribal 
development and human security has been a lack of economic resources available 
to Tribes.15 The fundamental elements of every community—education, health 
care, infrastructure, and public safety resources, to name a few—require 
significant capital to implement and maintain a quality of life. Tribes have 
perennially struggled to raise development capital due to factors such as 
geographic isolation, lack of access to markets, and a lack of willingness of 
traditional financing sources to invest in Tribal communities.16  With the cost of 
essential human security components subject to continual inflation, it is imperative 
14 Gaming Revenue Reports, NATIONAL INDIAN GAMING COMMISSION, 
http://www.nigc.gov/Gaming_Revenue_Reports.aspx, (last visited Nov. 19, 2014) (Data utilized for 
assessment: National Indian Gaming Commission Tribal Gaming Revenues, 1995 – 2013). 
15 W. GREGORY GUEDEL, STRATEGIES AND METHODS FOR TRIBAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 13 (2013). 
16 See id. at 45. 
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for Tribal governments to cultivate sustainable sources of capital that can be used 
to fund development programs. 
 
One of the landmark Sovereignty Events for Native American nations in the 
second half of the 20th Century was the outcome of California v. Cabazon Band of 
Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987).  In the mid-1980s, two Tribes in Southern 
California were conducting small on-reservation card and bingo gaming operations 
which catered to both Tribal members and non-Tribal visitors.  The State of 
California declared that such gaming operations were illegal under California law 
and demanded the Tribes cease the activity completely.  The Tribes refused, citing 
Tribal sovereignty, and asserted that the state did not have regulatory jurisdiction 
over the Tribe’s on-reservation economic activities.  The State of California 
subsequently sued the Tribes in federal court, and the case proceeded and was 
ultimately heard by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
 
In 1987, the Supreme Court ruled that state governments could not restrict 
Tribal gaming when other forms of gaming (e.g. a state lottery) were allowed within 
the state even if full casino gaming was not allowed.  The practical result of the 
decision was to open the way for Tribes to undertake Las Vegas-style casino 
gaming within the boundaries of their reservations.  The economic potential of the 
legal victory was readily apparent to both Tribes and the U.S. government. As 
Tribes began making plans for undertaking casino gaming, they conducted 
government-to-government talks with the U.S. to assess and manage future 
impacts.  A new agency, the National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC), was 
formed in 1988 as the national regulatory body and data repository for Tribal 
gaming. 
 
The NIGC began collecting and publishing national and regional Tribal 
gaming revenue data in 1995.  Presently, about 250 Tribes in 28 states are 
involved in Class III casino-style gaming.17  Graph 1 illustrates the growth in the 
collective revenue realized by gaming Tribes nationally from 1995 through the 
current reporting year. 
 
 
 
17 Dwanna L. Robertson, The Myth of Indian Casino Riches, INDIAN COUNTRY (June 23, 2012), 
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2012/06/23/myth-indian-casino-riches. 
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GRAPH 1 
 
 
 
The data indicates significant and continued growth in Tribal gaming 
revenue over the first reported decade, with collective revenue growth each year.  
Between 1995 and 2013, gaming Tribes nationally collected a total of over $293 
billion in revenue from casino operations.  These funds constitute a sovereign 
resource under the exclusive control of Tribal governments that can be utilized for 
economic and human security development programs in accordance with the 
needs and priorities of the communities they represent. 
 
Data-Based Associations – Case Study 1: 
 
• Tribal casino gaming, instituted by the Sovereignty Event of Tribes 
prevailing in California v. Cabazon, is associated with gaming Tribes 
collectively realizing tens of billions of dollars of additional annual revenue 
25
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW JOURNAL Volume III, Issue I – Fall 2014  
that is presently available to support economic development and other 
human security programs for Tribal communities.  
 
• Beginning in 2007, the collective revenue from Tribal casino operations has 
plateaued.  The nearly 400 percent growth in annual gaming revenue from 
1996 to 2006 has been followed by less than 7 percent total growth for the 
last seven years, including two consecutive years of negative or zero 
growth.   
 
The data revealed in this case study has significant implications for Tribal 
governments in their strategic planning for using the sovereign economic resource 
of gaming revenue.  While the raw revenue statistics for the full reporting period 
are impressive in terms of total dollars, the past seven years reflect a markedly 
reduced rate of growth for Tribal gaming income.  Market saturation, increased 
competition, and a general reduction in U.S. household spending have created 
significant challenges for the Tribal gaming industry.18   The data suggests that 
Tribal gaming revenue may have reached a peak level with limited future growth 
potential, increasing the importance of effective resource management and 
investment practices by Tribal governments. 
 
B. Case Study 2:  Tribal Gaming, Political Contributions, and United 
States Policy Outcomes19 
 
As transformative as gaming revenue has been for the on-reservation 
socio-economic conditions of Tribes, it has also led to increased Tribal influence 
outside their borders. The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) is an agency within the 
U.S. Department of Interior, and is the primary federal agency with which all Tribes 
18 In the past 10 years, numerous Tribes have closed gaming facilities and ceased operations, 
including the Apache Nation of Oklahoma, the Paskenta and San Ysabel in California, and the 
Spokane in Washington.  The Foxwoods Casino operated by the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, the 
largest gaming facility in the United States defaulted on $2.3 billion in debt in 2009 and its year-on-
year quarterly cash flow for Q2 2014 was down over 41%. See e.g., Journal Wire Services, Slow 
Recovery More Competition Hurting Foxwoods, PROVIDENCE JOURNAL (Aug. 18, 2014), Available at 
http://www.providencejournal. com/business/content/20140818-slow-recovery-more-competition-
hurting-foxwoods.ece (last visited, Nov. 9, 2014).   
19 Frederick J. Boehmke and Richard Witmer, Indian Nations as Interest Groups Tribal Motivations 
for Contributions to United States Senators, 65 POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY 179-191 (2012); 
Indian Gaming, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, Oct. 25, 2014, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/totals.php?cycle=2014&ind=G6550. 
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interact in their relationship with the federal government.  The BIA is also the 
agency with primary responsibility for administering and funding Native American 
human security programs on behalf of the federal government. Tribal human 
security programs administered by the BIA include: 
 
• Education 
• Social Services and Housing Improvement 
• Natural Resources Management and Disaster Relief 
• Economic Development 
• Law Enforcement 
• Infrastructure Development and Maintenance 
 
The BIA’s 2014 Green Book report states the agency’s human security 
mission: “Through Indian Affairs programs, Tribes improve the quality of life for 
their members, their Tribal government infrastructure, community infrastructure, 
education, job training, and employment opportunities along with other 
components of long term, sustainable development.”20 
 
Despite the BIA’s stated mission of support for Tribal development, in 1996, 
Tribes faced a major external human security crisis in their relationship with the 
United States government.  The U.S. Government Accountability Office and 
Congressional Budget Committees had both been investigating BIA operations for 
several years, and separately issued reports condemning program waste and 
operational inefficiencies and recommending the agency’s budget be cut by up to 
$250M beginning in FY 1998.21  Recognizing the impact of the proposed cuts to 
the BIA’s budget, in April 1996 Assistant U.S. Secretary of Indian Affairs Ada Deer 
stated: “If the final decisions of Congress are in alignment with the Budget 
Committees, Indian Tribes will suffer yet another major setback.”22 
 
20 BUDGET JUSTIFICATIONS AND PERFORMANCE INFORMATION FISCAL YEAR (2014) available at 
http://bia.gov/cs/groups/xocfo/documents/text/idc1-021730.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2014).  
21 Bureau of Indian Affairs: Information on Potential Budgetary Reductions for Fiscal Year 1998, 
U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (April 25, 1997), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/products/RCED-97-136R. 
22 Ada Deer, Assistant Secretary Deer Delivers Budget Cut Warning, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT 
OF INTERIOR NEWS (May 16, 1996), available at 
http://www.bia.gov/cs/groups/public/documents/text/idc014542.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2014). 
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The U.S. Senate, by traditional and internal committee structure, is the 
primary driver of federal policy and funding for Native American programs.23  Key 
members sit on the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, and their 
recommendations typically determine the level of annual BIA funding appropriation 
that is ultimately incorporated in the federal budget.  In response to the BIA budget 
cut recommendations of the GAO and CBO, Tribal governments began increasing 
the use of gaming revenue for political contributions to U.S. Senators. This 
increase has led to more focus on native issues and legislation providing 
increased federal funding and technical assistance to Tribes for their economic 
and human security development programs.  Graph 2 illustrates the level of Tribal 
gaming revenue dedicated to U.S. Senate political contributions between 1988 
and 2006: 24 
 
Graph 2 
 
 
 
23 The United States House of Representatives has a subcommittee for American Indian and 
Alaska Native Affairs, but it is one of five subcommittees to the larger House Committee on Natural 
Resources and does not appear to impact BIA funding appropriation levels to the extent of the 
stand-alone Senate Committee on Indian Affairs. 
24 Frederick J. Boehmke and Richard Witmer, Indian Nations as Interest Groups: Tribal Motivations 
for Contributions to U.S. Senators, 65 POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY 179-191 (2012). 
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Graph 3 illustrates the ultimate BIA funding appropriation levels approved 
by Congress and incorporated in the federal budget for the years 1997-2006.  Of 
particular note is the year 1998, the year the GAO and CBO had recommended 
significant reductions to the BIA budget.  Despite the auditors’ recommendations 
for cuts up to $250 million, the BIA budget was actually increased by 
approximately $90 million.  This Congressional action followed two election cycles 
(1995/96 and 1997/98) in which Tribes had significantly increased the amount of 
Tribal gaming revenue used for making political contributions to U.S. Senators.25 
 
Graph 3 (dollar figures in billions) 
 
25 See Graph 2 above. 
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To test the statistical association between Tribal political contributions and 
subsequent Congressional funding appropriations for the BIA, the yearly data was 
analyzed with a correlation matrix.  Correlations run on a scale from -1 to +1.  A 
value near -1 indicates an inverse correlation, wherein the movement of one factor 
is associated with an opposite movement of the correlating factor, whereas a value 
near +1 indicates a positive correlation suggesting a connected causality in factor 
movements.  The statistical correlation between political contributions and the BIA 
funding appropriation between 1997-2006 was 0.7849. This indicates a strong 
association between Tribal political contribution amounts and the pattern of 
increasing funding by Congress for BIA human security programs benefitting 
Native Americans.   
Having found a statistically significant association between Tribal political 
contributions to U.S. Senators and the subsequent Congressional funding 
appropriations for the BIA, new “control” variables were introduced into the 
analytical model in an effort to detect if other factors might have been responsible 
for the apparent connection.  Two control variables were selected for this study: 
 
1) The number of Senators during the period who were of Native 
American ancestry, and who therefore might have possessed an 
ethnic bias favorable to increasing BIA funding independent of any 
political contributions by Tribes; and 
 
2) The party majority status of the Senate was analyzed to determine 
if and for how long the Democratic Party was “in control” of the 
Senate by virtue of holding a majority of seats during the period. The 
Democratic Party has traditionally been viewed as more “pro-Tribal” 
than the Republican Party, which might influence its support for 
increasing BIA funding independent of any political contributions by 
Tribes.   
 
Congressional membership data reveals that there was only one U.S. 
Senator of self-identified Native American ancestry in office during the period, 
Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell of Colorado, which empirically rules out the 
theory that an increasing number of Native American Senators might have been 
working for BIA funding increases.  Further, Sen. Campbell retired in 2004, leaving 
the Senate without any Native American members for the final two years of the 
30
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case study period – yet the pattern of BIA funding increases was unaffected.  
Similarly, the Senate majority party for most of the period was actually the 
Republican Party, and the “control party” changed three times during this period.  
Regardless of which party held the majority of seats in the Senate, the pattern of 
BIA funding increases was unaffected.  Table 1 provides a regression analysis that 
includes the multivariate controls for potential ethnic bias and Senate party 
majority: 
 
Table 1 
 
Multivariate Controls for Senators’ Ethnic Bias and Senate Party Control 
 
biafunding Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t|  [95% Conf. Interval]
       
contributions 985.2932 206.9152 4.78 0.003 481.4369 1489.149
num_natam 2.05e+08 1.02e+08 -2.01 0.091 -4.53e+08 4.40e+07
major_dem 1.09e+08 7.59e+07 1.43 0.201 -7.69e+07 2.95e+08
_cons 1.73e+09 1.09e+08 15.90 0.000 1.46e+09 1.99e+09
 
The P-values and Confidence Intervals for the three variables indicate that 
neither potential ethnic bias of Native American Senators nor the party in control of 
the Senate had a statistically significant impact on the association between Tribal 
gaming political contributions and the subsequent Congressional funding 
allocations for the BIA. 
 
The median and total dollar figures for Tribal gaming political contributions 
demonstrate a substantial rate of return for Tribes, measured by the BIA funding 
increases during the case study period: 
 
Total Tribal Gaming Political Contributions, 1997-2006:   
                                                                                                                 $2,300,000 
Total Increase in Annual Funding for BIA, 1997-2006: 
                                                                                                             $547,988,000 
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Median Annual Tribal Gaming Political Contributions, 1997-2006:
                                                                                                                   $255,555
Median Annual Increase of BIA Funding, 1997-2006:
                                                                                                              $60,887,555 
 
Subsequent to the time period for Case Study #2, it appears that Tribal 
governments have recognized the value of this form of diplomatic advocacy for 
their human security programs and have continued to utilize it in earnest.  In the 
state and federal election campaign cycles of 2007 and 2008, four of the top-10 
largest political donors in the U.S. were Native American-controlled groups.26  
These four donor organizations spent a combined total of $129.8 million on state 
and federal political campaigns; together they donated more than double that of 
the top national donor (the National Education Association), which spent $56.3 
million during the cycle.27 The continuing funding pattern for Tribal human security 
programs within the BIA by the United States government certainly validates this 
approach: 
 
• FY 2012 Congressional Appropriation for Bureau of Indian Affairs: 
$2,746,178,000 
• Total Increase in Annual BIA Appropriation Since FY 1997: $1,302,676,000 
• There has been a 90.2% increase in annual Congressional funding of BIA 
Native American human security programs since the start of political 
contributions financed by Tribal gaming.28 
 
Data-Based Associations – Case Study #2: 
 
The availability of gaming revenue provided new resources for Tribal 
political advocacy regarding United States policies affecting Native American 
26 Rob Capriccioso, Tribes Among Biggest Campaign Donors, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA 
NETWORK.COM (May 22, 2011), available at 
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2011/03/22/tribes-among-biggest-campaign-
contributors- 23876 (last visited Nov. 9 2014).  
27 Id.  
28 Budget Justifications and Performance Information of Year 2014, U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR 
(2014), available at http://bia.gov/cs/groups/xocfo/documents/text/idc1-021730.pdf.  
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human security. The threat of significant reductions in United States government 
funding for Tribal human security programs was followed closely in time by the 
Sovereignty Event of Tribes’ markedly increased use of gaming funds for political 
contributions to members of the United States Senate. The increased use of Tribal 
gaming revenue for this form of diplomatic advocacy was followed by favorable 
outcomes in United States congressional appropriations for Native American 
human security development programs within the Bureau of Indian Affairs, which 
provided a positive fiscal investment in Tribal programs by the United States that 
significantly exceeded the total capital investment by Tribal governments.29   
  
 
 
C. Case Study 3:  Tribal Gaming and Native American Poverty Level 
Outcomes30    
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This case study analyzes the internal human security condition of poverty 
within Native American nations, and is designed to examine whether casino 
revenue received by gaming Tribes has a measurable impact on the rate of 
poverty for their members.  As a threshold matter, it is important to note that not all 
Native American nations are involved in gaming.  Of the 566 federally recognized 
Tribes within the U.S., less than half have IGRA Class III casino-style gaming 
operations.31  Due to geographic and economic factors, particularly travel 
distances from reservations to major population centers, gaming is not a viable 
economic activity for many Native American nations.32 
 
The National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC) is the oversight agency 
for all Tribal gaming that issues annual reports detailing Tribal gaming revenue 
29 Green Book, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, (Nov. 19, 2014), http://www.bia.gov/WhoWeAre/AS-
IA/OCFO/TBAC/BDDoc/Greenbook/index.htm.  
30 Gaming Revenue by Region 2001-2010, NATIONAL INDIAN GAMING COMMISSION 
http://www.nigc.gov/Gaming_Revenue_Reports.aspx (last visited Oct. 13, 2014); U.S. CENSUS: 
AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE SUMMARY FILES (2000) available at 
http://www.census.gov/census2000/AIANSF.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2014); U.S. CENSUS: 
American Community Survey American Indian and Alaska Native Tables (2010) available at 
http://www.census.gov/aian/census_2010/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2014).  
31 25 U.S.C. § 2710 (2014) (classifying bingo-style games as Class II; Class III including dice, 
roulette, slot machine, and card table games). 
32 Dispelling the Myths About Indian Gaming, NATIVE AMERICAN RIGHTS FUND, 
http://www.narf.org/pubs/misc/gaming.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2014).   
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statistics.  NIGC gaming revenue data is aggregated and reported on a national 
and regional basis; the agency does not provide revenue statistics for the gaming 
operations of individual Tribes, as that information is considered sovereign 
property and confidential.  For this case study, the selected sample data for 
gaming revenue is for NIGC Region 1, which is comprised of the gaming Tribes 
located in the state of Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and Alaska.  The collective 
gaming revenue for Region 1 Tribes for the ten-year period between 2001 and 
2010 is reflected in Table 3: 
 
TABLE 3 
 
NIGC REGION 1 COMBINED ANNUAL 
TRIBAL GAMING REVENUE, 2001-201033 
 
        YEAR 
 
REVENUE 
     
        2001 
 
1,013,470,000 
     2002 
 
1,196,178,000 
     2003 
 
1,439,516,000 
     2004 
 
1,601,346,000 
     2005 
 
1,829,195,000 
     2006 
 
2,080,369,000 
     2007 
 
2,263,950,000 
     2008 
 
2,376,025,000 
     2009 
 
2,520,908,000 
     2010 
 
2,665,096,000 
     
        TOTAL – 2001-2010: 
 
18,986,053,000 
      
The NIGC data reflects a steady and significant growth in gaming revenue 
for Region 1 Tribes during the period.  At the start of the decade, the annual 
collective revenue among the Tribes was approximately $1 billion.34  By the end of 
the decade, their collective annual revenue had increased over 2.5 times to $2.6 
billion, and the revenue increased significantly each year during this period.  In 
total, Region 1 Tribes collected nearly $19 billion in revenue from their gaming 
activities between 2001-2010. 
33 Gaming Revenues by Region, NATIONAL INDIAN GAMING COMMISSION, 
http://www.nigc.gov/Gaming_Revenue_Reports.aspx (last visited Oct. 13, 2014). 
34 Id. 
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These particular years were selected for this case study to coincide with the 
poverty data reported by the 2000 US Census and the 2010 US Census, allowing 
for a before-and-after comparison of poverty levels within Region 1 Tribes relative 
to the Tribal governments’ collective receipt of the $19 billion in gaming revenue 
over the decade.  Using NIGC reports, the specific gaming Tribes within Region 1 
were identified.  Then, the population and poverty statistics for each Region 1 
gaming Tribe were gathered from US Census for the year 2000 and 2010.  Mean 
poverty rates were calculated for the Region 1 Tribes for 2000 and 2010, and 
compared with the national average poverty rate for all Tribes in the U.S. for those 
years as reported by the US Census.  Using Tribal and state government 
information resources, it was also possible to identify which of the Region 1 
gaming Tribes issued per-capita payments to their members as a means of 
providing direct personal income support from gaming revenue. 
 
The results of the NIGC Region 1 gaming revenue and Tribal poverty 
percentage case study are listed in the following table: 
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NIGC REGION I GAMING TRIBES: ON-RESERVATION POPULATION AND POVERTY STATISTICS, 2000 & 2010
2000 2000 2000 2010 2010 2010 Per Capita
Tribe Population <Poverty Poverty % Population <Poverty Poverty % Payments
Coeur d'Alene 1476 350 23.7 1726 425 24 Yes
Colville 8212 1944 23.7 8324 2443 29.3 Yes
Coquille 362 59 16.3 475 58 12.2 No
Jamestown S'Klallam 24 0 0 19 0 0 No
Klamath 2620 729 27.8 2431 604 24.8 Yes
Lower Elwha 369 98 26.6 825 388 47 Yes
Muckleshoot 3586 573 16 4204 924 22 Yes
Nez Perce 3981 926 23.3 3320 719 21.6 Yes
Nisqually 442 158 35.7 524 114 21.7 Yes
Nooksack 727 248 34.1 1159 379 32.7 No
Port Gamble 509 82 16.1 788 176 22.3 No
Puyallup 1510 398 26.4 2346 532 22.6 Yes
Quinault 2157 618 28.7 2005 574 28.6 No
Siletz 1718 362 21.1 2452 928 37.8 Yes
Skokomish 681 207 30.4 485 99 20.4 No
Spokane 2370 722 30.5 2261 613 27.1 Yes
Squaxin Island 440 138 31.4 461 57 12.4 Yes
Suquamish 3482 297 8.5 4025 398 9.8 Yes
Swinomish 581 196 33.7 907 488 53.8 No
Tulalip 2381 604 25.4 2645 648 24.5 Yes
Umatilla 1562 279 17.9 1605 373 23.2 Yes
Upper Skagit 362 115 31.8 1030 352 34.1 Yes
Warm Springs 3143 1043 33.2 3531 1918 54.3 Yes
Yakama 7887 2520 32 8882 3156 35 Yes
TOTALS 50582 12666 56430 16366
MEAN POVERTY RATE OF REGION I TRIBES  2000: 25%   SD=8.76  SE=1.78  2010: 29%   SD=12.84  SE=2.62
NATIONAL AVERAGE FOR ALL TRIBES IN U.S. 25.7% 27%
Number of Tribes with Increased Poverty Rate, 2000-2010: 12 Number of Tribes Issuing Per Capita Payments to Members: 17
Number of Tribes with Decreased Poverty Rate, 2000-2010: 12 Number of Tribes with No Per Capita Payments to Members: 7
Per Capita Tribes with Increased Poverty 2000-2010: 58.8%  (10 out of 17)
Non-Per Capita Tribes with Increased Poverty 2000-2010: 28.5%  (2 out of 7)
Notes
2000 Data: 2000 Census, American Indian and Alaska Native Summary File
2010 Data: 2010 Census, American Community Survey, American Indian and Alaska Native Tables
2000 and/or 2010 Census data not available for the following NIGC Region I Gaming Tribes:
Coos, Chehalis, Grand Ronde, Cow Creek, Kalispel, Klawock, Kootenai, Lummi, Metlakatla, Shoalwater, 
Shoshone-Bannock, Snoqualmie, and Stillaguamish.
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The results from this case study were unexpectedly complex.  From an 
economic perspective, it would be reasonable to expect the infusion of new capital 
provided by Tribal gaming to be a catalyst for poverty reduction, and likewise 
expect to see the individual and collective poverty percentages for Tribes 
decrease.  On a collective basis, the actual results for Region 1 Tribes 
demonstrated the opposite.  In 2000, the median poverty rate for gaming Tribes in 
NIGC Region 1 was 25 percent, slightly below the rate for all Tribes in the U.S., 
which stood at 25.7 percent.  Ten years and 19 billion dollars later, the median 
poverty rate for these same gaming Tribes in NIGC Region 1 increased to 29 
percent - an increase of four percentage points from the beginning of the decade, 
which also placed the Region 1 Tribes two percentage points higher than the 2010 
national average for all Tribes of 27 percent.  The combined total population of the 
Region 1 Tribes in the case study increased by 5848 people during the decade.  
The combined total population below the poverty level during the period increased 
by 3700, nearly two-thirds of the total population increase. 
 
Per capita payments are a controversial issue within Tribal nations.  Every 
Tribe has a sovereign right to determine whether, when, and in what amounts it 
will issue per capita payments to its members. The institution, conditions, and 
management of a per capita regime are matters of individual Tribal discretion.  In 
Tribes with high unemployment and poverty, per capita payments are often viewed 
as a means of collective support by and for Tribal members, with each member 
eligible for an equal share of Tribal wealth.  However, questions have arisen 
regarding the effectiveness of per capita payments for poverty reduction in Native 
communities; some have likened them to a welfare-type system that provides a 
disincentive for work and dissipates Tribal economic resources that could be better 
used to finance strategic initiatives such as scholarships for higher education.35  
For the gaming Tribes in NIGC Region 1, the statistical results of Case Study 3 
indicate an inverse correlation between per capita payments and poverty 
reduction.  Of the 24 Tribes studied, 17 issue per capita payments to members, 7 
do not.  Of the per capita Tribes, 58.8 percent (10 out of 17) experienced an 
increased poverty rate from 2000-2010.  In contrast, of the Tribes that do not issue 
35 Leland McGee, Greed, Corruption, and Indian Country’s New Welfare States, INDIAN COUNTRY 
TODAY (June 27, 2013), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2013/06/27/greed-corruption-
and-indian-countrys-new-welfare-states.   
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per capita payments, only 28.8 percent (2 out of 7) experienced increased poverty 
during the period. 
 
Data-Based Associations- Case Study #3: 
 
• Tribal gaming activity is associated with sustained annual revenue 
increases for NIGC Region 1 Gaming Tribes from 2000-2010. 
• Tribal gaming revenue is not associated with an overall reduction in poverty 
for NIGC Region 1 Gaming Tribes during this period. 
• From 2000-2010, the mean poverty rate of NIGC Region 1 Gaming Tribes 
increased from slightly below the national average for all Tribes in 2000 to 
two percentage points higher than the national average in 2010. 
• Poverty outcomes varied widely among NIGC Region 1 Gaming Tribes 
during this period, with some experiencing a 50 percent or more reduction 
and others experiencing a 100 percent or more increase. 
• The standard deviation and standard error of individual Tribal poverty rates 
from the mean increased by 32 percent, indicating that the differences in 
poverty outcomes between Tribes grew notably during the period, with a 
greater gap between Tribes experiencing increased poverty and those that 
were successful in reducing poverty. 
• Certain Tribes with very similar population size, geography, and economic 
resources experienced starkly different poverty outcomes over the decade.  
For example, the Squaxin Island Tribe reduced its poverty rate from 31.4 
percent to 12.4 percent during this period, while the Swinomish Tribe’s 
poverty rate increased from 33.7 percent to 53.8 percent. 
• There was an inverse correlation between per capita payments and poverty 
reduction, with per capita Tribes significantly less likely to have achieved 
poverty reduction during this period than Tribes that did not issue per capita 
payments to members. 
III. CONCLUSION: EMERGENT RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND NEXT STEPS 
 
A macro-level analysis of the results of these case studies confirms some 
fundamental facts that are crucial for the study of economic and human security 
development in Native American nations.  While Tribes have theoretical equality in 
their level of sovereignty from a legal perspective, Tribes are very diverse in how 
their sovereignty is actually exercised, and there is significant disparity in the 
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results that follow from their management of sovereign resources and policies.  
While there are some clear correlations between Sovereignty Events and 
improved human security outcomes, e.g. the increase in BIA program funding 
following Tribal political contributions, the research also revealed some puzzling 
results.  The dramatic differences in poverty outcomes between the Region 1 
gaming Tribes, despite these Tribes having similar structural conditions and 
sharing in nearly $19 billion in gaming revenue over a decade, indicates that equal 
sovereignty does not produce equal development results for Tribal communities. 
 
From this research, key questions have emerged for further examination: 
 
• What explains the differences in economic and human security 
development outcomes between similarly situated Tribes? 
• What policies and actions are most effective for improving Native 
American economic and human security indicators? 
 
To answer these questions, future research will include: (1) continued data 
collection on key human security indicators such as economic development, public 
health, social justice; (2) interviews with Tribal leaders regarding 
effective/ineffective human security policies and programs; and (3) development of 
data-supported theoretical approaches to assessing and implementing Tribal 
human security initiatives. 
 
The research will be facilitated by a public event to be hosted in Seattle in 
the spring of 2015.  With funding support from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, 
a two-day program entitled Sovereignty, Development, and Human Security: A 
Colloquium On U.S./Native American Relations will be held at the University of 
Washington.  The colloquium will bring together leaders from Native American 
nations and U.S. government agencies for presentations and dialogue on effective 
programs and practices for economic and human security development.  The 
presentations will be filmed for podcast downloading, and key information and 
policy recommendations from Tribal leaders will be published in future articles. 
 
 
39
